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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,1 the 
Supreme Court will consider whether Proposal 2, an amendment to 
the Michigan Constitution banning race as a factor in state university 
admissions, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 Specifically, Proposal 
2 makes it unconstitutional in Michigan for democratically-elected 
members of university governing boards to establish race-based 
affirmative action admissions programs, but does not place a 
corresponding burden on other admissions factors.3 The Sixth Circuit 
analyzed Proposal 2 using the political process doctrine4 established 
by the so-called “Hunter trilogy.”5 Under the political process 
doctrine, a political structure that places “special burdens on the 
ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation” must be 
 
∗ J.D. Candidate, 2015, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466 (6th 
Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 
1633 (2013).  
 2.  See id. at 473 (identifying the relevant issue as “whether Proposal 2 runs afoul of the 
constitutional guarantee of equal  protection by removing the power of university officials to 
even consider using race as a factor  in university admissions decisions”).  
 3.  Id. at 481–83. 
 4.  Id. at 474–85 (applying the political process doctrine). 
 5.  L. Darnell Weeden, Affirmative Action California Style—Proposition 209: The Right 
Message While Avoiding a Fatal Constitutional Attraction Because of Race and Sex, 21 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 281, 291 (1997). The “Hunter trilogy” consists of Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 
(1969), Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982), and Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. 
of L.A., 458 U.S. 527 (1982). 
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analyzed under strict scrutiny.6 Proposal 2 failed strict scrutiny 
because Michigan did not provide a compelling interest for enacting 
the Amendment.7 Thus, Proposal 2 violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.8 
Ambiguities in the political process doctrine create inconsistent 
judicial application,9 especially when judges apply the political process 
doctrine in affirmative action cases, as exemplified by Schuette.10 In 
fact, the Sixth Circuit opinion relies on an inaccurate application of 
affirmative action precedent because a valid affirmative action 
program cannot violate the political process doctrine.11 Accordingly, 
the Court should reverse the Sixth Circuit and distinguish Schuette by 
holding that the political process doctrine does not apply when a 
government restructuring effectively repeals affirmative action in 
favor of race-neutral admissions policies. This holding would not 
require formally overruling the political process doctrine and would 
avoid the analytical problems that result due to the incompatibility 
between the political process doctrine and the Court’s affirmative 
action jurisprudence.12 After settling the political process question, the 
Court should analyze Proposal 2 under a traditional Equal Protection 
 
         6.     Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 467. 
 7.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 488–89 (“[B]ecause the Attorney 
General does not assert that Proposal 2 satisfies a compelling state interest, we need not 
consider this argument.”). 
 8.  Id. at 489 (“Therefore, those portions of Proposal 2 that affect Michigan’s public 
institutions of higher education violate the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 9.  See Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L.J. 187, 269–70 (1997) (discussing 
problems with judicial application of the political process doctrine). Spann notes that ambiguity 
in the political process doctrine creates the undesirable outcome of allowing judges to tailor 
decisions based on their own personal views of affirmative action. Id.  
 10.  See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 493 (Boggs, J., dissenting) 
(“[H]olding it to be a violation of equal protection for the ultimate political authority to declare 
a uniform policy of non-discrimination is vastly far afield from the Supreme Court 
precedents.”); but see id. at 485–86 (majority opinion) (holding that the political process 
doctrine applies to both race-neutral and race-preference measures). 
 11.  David Bernstein, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action: Forgetting the 
Narrative, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 2, 2013, 9:39 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/10/02/ 
schuette-v-coalition-defend-affirmative-action-forgetting-narrative/. Bernstein notes that a valid 
affirmative action policy must benefit the entire student body, not just minority students. Id. 
However, the Sixth Circuit determined that Proposal 2 created political process concerns 
because it invalidated affirmative action policies that provided benefits to minorities. Id. Thus, 
the Sixth Circuit’s political process analysis cannot stand under a true reading of the Court’s 
affirmative action jurisprudence. Id.; Brief for Petitioner at 22–23, Schuette v. Coal. to Defend 
Affirmative Action, No. 12–682 (U.S. June 24, 2013). 
 12.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 23 (“A Grutter plan and a political-
restructuring theory are incompatible.”). 
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analysis, and hold that Proposal 2 is constitutional.13 
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  Proposal 2 
Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger14 
and Grutter v. Bollinger,15 opponents of affirmative action 
spearheaded a movement to amend the Michigan Constitution to 
invalidate affirmative action admissions policies.16 The initiative, 
known as Proposal 2, earned a spot on Michigan’s November 2006 
election ballot,17 and passed with 58 percent of the vote.18 Proposal 2 
amended Article I of the Michigan Constitution to include provisions 
stating: 
(1) The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne 
State University, and any other public college or university, 
community college or school district shall not discriminate against, 
or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the 
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the 
operation of public employment, public education, or public 
contracting. 
(2) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential 
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, 
color, ethnicity or national origin in the operation of public 
employment, public education, or public contracting. 
(3) For the purposes of this section “state” includes, but is not 
necessarily limited to, the state itself, any city, county, any public 
college, university, or community college, school district, or other 
political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or within 
 
 13.  Id. at 14–16. 
 14.  539 U.S. 244 (2003).  
 15.  539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 16.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 471 
(6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. 
Ct. 1633 (2013).  
 17.  Id. The Michigan Constitution restricts ballot access to initiatives that receive 
signatures from ten percent of the total votes in the previous gubernatorial election. Operation 
King’s Dream v. Connerly, 501 F.3d 584, 587 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2). 
Proposal 2 received 508,202 signatures, but only needed 317,757. Id.  
 18.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 471. Notably, the Sixth Circuit 
considered an appeal concerning whether Proposal 2 received enough signatures to gain 
inclusion on the ballot by means of fraud, but dismissed the appeal as moot because Proposal 2 
had already passed. Operation King’s Dream, 501 F.3d at 592. 
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the State of Michigan not included in sub-section 1.19 
B. Procedural History: The District Court and Sixth Circuit Panel 
Decision 
Two plaintiffs groups filed suits in the Eastern District of 
Michigan challenging the constitutionality of Proposal 2 as applied to 
higher education: the Coalition plaintiffs, comprised of individuals 
and opposition groups, and the Cantrell plaintiffs, a group of faculty 
members and some prospective and current students at the University 
of Michigan (collectively, the Respondents).20 The district court 
consolidated the cases and granted Michigan’s motion for summary 
judgment, concluding Proposal 2 did not violate the political process 
doctrine of the Equal Protection Clause.21 The court found that the 
doctrine did not prohibit “programs that give an advantage on the 
basis of race as a remedy to combatting other social disadvantages.”22 
However, in a 2-1 panel decision, the Sixth Circuit reversed and 
granted summary judgment for Respondents, holding that Proposal 2 
violated the political process doctrine.23 Specifically, Proposal 2 
“modifie[d] Michigan’s political process to place special burdens on 
the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation,” but 
was not alleged to fulfill  a compelling state interest as required under 
strict scrutiny.24 The Sixth Circuit granted Michigan’s subsequent 
request for en banc review.25 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  The Equal Protection Clause: Traditional Analysis 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
declares: “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”26 
 
 19.  MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26. 
 20.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 472. The Coalition plaintiffs included 
the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration, and Immigration Rights and Fight for 
Equality by Any Means Necessary. Id. 
 21.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 
924, 932, 960 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
       22.    Id. at 957. 
 23.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 652 F.3d 607, 
631, 633 (6th Cir. 2011). 
       24.    Id. at 631 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 25.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 473. 
 26.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he central purpose of the Equal 
Protection Clause . . . is the prevention of official conduct 
discriminating on the basis of race.”27 Accordingly, all explicit racial 
classifications, including benign racial classifications, receive strict 
scrutiny review.28 To survive strict scrutiny, the law must be narrowly 
tailored to fulfill a compelling government interest.29 
Facially neutral laws also receive strict scrutiny review if they have 
a discriminatory impact on a racial minority and were passed for a 
discriminatory purpose.30 The discriminatory purpose need not be 
explicit and may “be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, 
including . . . that the law bears more heavily on one race than 
another.”31 However, the Court has clarified that to find a 
discriminatory purpose the law must have been passed “‘because of,’ 
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group.”32 Without both discriminatory impact and discriminatory 
purpose, the law need only satisfy rational basis review, under which 
the law survives an equal protection challenge if it can “rationally . . . 
be said to serve a purpose the Government is constitutionally 
empowered to pursue.”33 
B.  The Equal Protection Clause: Political Process Doctrine 
1.  The Hunter Trilogy: Introduction 
The political process doctrine is a “less familiar and more nuanced 
branch of equal protection doctrine.”34 It holds that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits “‘a political structure that treats all individuals 
as equals,’ yet more subtly distorts governmental processes in such a 
way as to place special burdens on the ability of minority groups to 
 
 27.  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
 28.  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 29.  Id. at 235. 
 30.  See Washington, 426 U.S. at 239–42 (noting that “[d]isproportionate impact is not 
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the 
Constitution” and that the Court’s “cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other 
official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is 
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially discriminatory impact”). 
 31.  Id. at 242. 
 32.  Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
 33.  See Washington, 426 U.S. at 245–48 (applying only rational basis review even though 
the race-neutral qualification test had a disproportionate impact on minorities, because the 
Court found no evidence of a racially discriminatory purpose). 
 34.  Vikram D. Amar & Evan H. Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal Burdens, and the 
CCRI, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019, 1024 (1996). 
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achieve beneficial legislation.”35 Unlike traditional equal protection 
analysis, which focuses on discriminatory intent, the political process 
doctrine focuses on the discriminatory effect of government 
restructuring.36 The doctrine is rooted in three cases known as the 
“Hunter trilogy”37: Hunter v. Erickson,38 Washington v. Seattle School 
District,39 and Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education.40 Each 
case in the Hunter trilogy adds a separate element to the doctrine, and 
it is therefore worthwhile to consider each case in turn. 
i. Hunter: The Foundation 
In Hunter, the Court first established that a government 
restructuring violates the Equal Protection Clause if it burdens 
minority interests, and only minority interests, within the political 
process.41 There, the Akron City Council passed a fair housing 
ordinance designed to prevent racial discrimination in the real estate 
market.42 Akron voters subsequently amended the city charter so that 
any law regulating the real estate market based on racial 
considerations had to receive a majority vote at a general election to 
pass.43  
The Court held that the charter amendment violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.44 It noted that although the amendment was 
facially neutral, it primarily harmed racial minorities because 
minorities would have benefitted from the fair housing ordinance.45 
Further, the majority vote requirement burdened future efforts by 
 
 35.  Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982) (quoting Mobile v. 
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 84 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 36.  See Amar & Caminker, supra note 34, at 1035 (discussing “concern for effect rather 
than intent” in the political process doctrine). Amar and Caminker point to evidence in the 
Court’s Seattle School District opinion to refute the argument that the political process doctrine 
is an implicit “soft intent” inquiry that allows the Court to find discriminatory intent when the 
Court believes there is discriminatory intent, but lacks sufficient evidence to meet the 
Washington v. Davis test. Id. at 1034–35. They also observe that although the political process 
doctrine’s focus on effect differs from the traditional equal protection framework, it aligns the 
political process doctrine with cases dealing with burdens imposed on the “exercise of political 
rights such as voting and jury service.” Id. at 1035. 
 37.  Weeden, supra note 5, at 291. 
 38.  393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
 39.  458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
 40.  458 U.S. 527 (1982). 
 41.  See Amar & Caminker, supra note 34, at 1024. 
 42.  Hunter, 393 U.S. at 386.  
 43.  Id. at 387. 
 44.  Id. at 393. 
 45.  Id. at 390–91. 
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minorities to secure laws prohibiting racial discrimination in the 
housing market, but placed no corresponding burden on laws 
forbidding discrimination based on other classifications, such as 
political affiliation.46 Because the amendment targeted a law designed 
to benefit racial minorities and restructured the political process to 
discriminatorily burden minority interests, the Court applied strict 
scrutiny.47 In the strict scrutiny inquiry, the Court noted that Akron 
did not justify the amendment with a compelling government interest, 
and therefore the amendment was unconstitutional.48 
ii. Seattle School District: Removing Authority to a Higher Level 
of Government 
In Seattle School District, the Court further developed the political 
process doctrine by holding that a government restructuring creates a 
discriminatory burden when it moves only the power to enact policies 
benefitting racial minorities from a lower level of government to a 
higher level of government. There, the Seattle School District adopted 
the “Seattle Plan,” a mandatory busing system designed to remedy de 
facto racial segregation in the local school system.49 In response, 
Seattle residents passed Initiative 350, a state-wide policy which 
forbid school boards from busing students to a school that was not 
“geographically nearest or next nearest the student’s place of 
residence.”50 
Relying on Hunter, the Court struck down Initiative 350 as a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.51 The Court noted that 
although Initiative 350 was facially neutral, it targeted busing to 
remedy racial segregation, a program designed to benefit racial 
minorities.52 Moreover, Initiative 350 reallocated the power to enact 
racial busing policies from local government to state government, but 
did not place a corresponding burden on busing for other purposes.53 
 
 46.  Id. at 391. 
 47.  Id. at 391–93. 
 48.  Id. Akron attempted to justify the amendment as a reflection of the public’s desire to 
move slowly when forming policies impacting race relations. Id. at 392. Akron also argued that 
the state has free reign to allocate legislative power. Id. Finally, Akron argued that because the 
amendment passed through a referendum, it should be immune from judicial review. Id. The 
Court rejected all these justifications. Id. at 392–93. 
 49.  Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 460–61 (1982) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 50.  Id. at 461–62. 
 51.  Id. at 470. 
 52.  Id. at 471–74.  
 53.  Id. at 474 (“The initiative removes the authority to address a racial problem—and only 
D'ALESSIO 1.23.2014 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2014  9:01 AM 
110 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 9 
Through this reallocation of power, Initiative 350 created a 
discriminatory burden against minorities and therefore violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.54 
iii. Crawford: Repealing Policies Designed to Benefit Racial 
Minorities 
In Crawford, the third and final case in the Hunter trilogy, the 
Court held that the repeal of legislation benefitting racial minorities 
does not violate the political process doctrine.55 There, California 
voters passed Proposition I, an amendment to the California 
Constitution that prohibited California courts from ordering racial 
busing in situations in which a federal court would not have authority 
to order busing.56 Prior to the passage of Proposition I, California 
state courts had more expansive authority than federal courts when 
ordering student busing to remedy public school segregation.57  
The Supreme Court analyzed Proposition I under the political 
process doctrine and held that it was constitutional.58 The Court noted 
that “the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or anti-
discrimination laws, without more, never has been viewed as 
embodying a presumptively invalid racial classification.”59 Thus, 
having provided more expansive busing than that required by the 
United States Constitution, California’s decision to curtail its busing 
program so as to better align it with the federal criteria was valid.60 
However, the Court noted that a repeal coupled with a burden on 
future minority efforts to achieve beneficial legislation, such as the 
majority vote requirement in Hunter, would violate the political 
process doctrine.61 
 
 
 
a racial problem—from the existing decisionmaking body, in such a way as to burden minority 
interests.”). 
 54.  Id. at 483–84, 486–87. 
 55.  Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of L.A., 458 U.S. 527, 542 (1982). 
 56.  Id. at 531–32. 
 57.  Id. at 535. 
 58.  Id. at 540–42. 
 59.  Id. at 539. 
 60.  Id. at 542. 
 61.  Id. at 540–42. 
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2.  Coalition for Economic Equity 
In 1997, the Ninth Circuit decided Coalition for Economic Equity 
v. Wilson,62 a case with facts virtually identical to those in Schuette. In 
Wilson, California voters passed Proposition 209, an amendment to 
the California Constitution that forbid race-based discrimination and 
preferential treatment in public employment, public education, and 
public contracting.63 In the ensuing challenge, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that Proposition 209 did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause under a traditional analysis.64 The court also held Proposal 2 
did not trigger political process concerns because the political process 
doctrine did not apply to the repeal of race-preference policies, like 
affirmative action.65 The court characterized Proposition 209 as race 
neutral because, by prohibiting racial discrimination, it prevented 
minorities from achieving preferential treatment through affirmative 
action.66 The Ninth Circuit distinguished Hunter and Seattle, noting 
that those cases concerned burdens on enacting policies designed to 
remedy racial discrimination, whereas Proposition 209 repealed race-
preference policies to create a baseline of racial neutrality.67 
3. The Test 
The political process doctrine creates a two-part inquiry.68 If both 
prongs are satisfied, strict scrutiny applies, meaning the law must be 
narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest to survive an 
equal protection challenge.69 In the first prong, a court considers 
 
 62.  122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 63.  Id. at 696. 
 64.  Id. at 702. 
 65.  See id. at 709 (referring to application of the political process doctrine as an 
“erroneous legal premise”). 
 66.  See id. at 708 (“Plaintiffs challenge Proposition 209 not as an impediment to protection 
against unequal treatment but as an impediment to receiving preferential treatment. The 
controlling words, we must remember, are ‘equal’ and ‘protection.’ Impediments to preferential 
treatment do not deny equal protection.”). 
 67.  Id. at 706–07. 
 68.  Amar & Caminker, supra note 34, at 1022. The Sixth Circuit majority opinion in 
Schuette follows a nearly identical two-part inquiry. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 477 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that Hunter and Seattle 
held that the political process doctrine applies when the government action “(1) has a racial 
focus, targeting a policy or program that ‘inures primarily to the benefit of the minority,’” and 
(2) “reorders the decisionmaking process in a way that places special burdens on a minority 
group’s ability to achieve its goals through that process”), cert. granted sub nom. Schuette v. 
Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013). 
 69.  Amar & Caminker, supra note 34, at 1055 (advocating application of strict scrutiny to 
California’s Proposition 209 because it fulfills the racial character and discriminatory burden 
prongs). 
D'ALESSIO 1.23.2014 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2014  9:01 AM 
112 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 9 
whether the law is “racial in character,” meaning it both “regulates a 
racial subject matter” and “regulates the subject matter to the 
detriment of the racial minority.”70 The Supreme Court has held this 
prong can be satisfied through laws that have “textual references to 
race,” laws that exclusively impact “racial matters,” and laws that have 
a negative impact on “the interests of minorities.”71 
In the second prong, a court considers whether the governmental 
restructuring places an asymmetric burden on the ability of minority 
groups to advocate for legislation.72 This means the restructuring 
burdens minority interests, but does not place a corresponding burden 
on non-minority interests.73 For instance, in Hunter, the Court noted 
the amendment subjected only legislation prohibiting racial 
discrimination to a majority vote, but placed no corresponding burden 
on legislation prohibiting discrimination based on other factors, such 
as political affiliation.74 On the other hand, the repeal of legislation 
beneficial to minorities, absent the imposition of a burden on future 
efforts to secure beneficial legislation, does not create a 
discriminatory burden, and thus fails the second prong.75 
C. The Court’s Limits on Affirmative Action 
The Supreme Court has set out a well-defined roadmap for 
establishing valid affirmative action admissions policies. Affirmative 
action policies at state universities must pass strict scrutiny because 
they explicitly classify applicants along racial lines.76 Thus, these 
programs must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
government interest. A valid affirmative action program furthers the 
compelling government interest in achieving holistic diversity in 
higher education.77 Diversity in this context benefits all students, 
regardless of race, by breaking down stereotypes and by preparing 
 
 70.  Id. at 1029 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71.  Id. at 1030–32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing Hunter, Seattle, and 
Crawford). 
 72.  Id. at 1041. 
 73.  Id. at 1042–43. 
 74.  Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969). 
 75.  Amar and Caminker, supra note 34, at 1044 (discussing Crawford’s holding that repeal 
does not trigger strict scrutiny as “consistent with . . . the central message of Hunter-Seattle”). 
 76.  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) (holding that both the district court 
and the court of appeals conducted improper strict scrutiny analyses of the University’s 
admissions program by granting too much deference to the University); Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306, 326–27 (2003). 
 77.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329–30. 
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students to enter a diverse workforce.78 Holistic diversity often 
encompasses race, but only as a single element among others, such as 
regional identity.79 Yet, the narrow tailoring prong forbids the use of 
explicit racial quotas.80 To satisfy the narrow tailoring prong, the 
admissions policy must treat race as a single, non-dispositive factor, 
within the context of individual review.81  
IV. HOLDING 
In an en banc decision, the Sixth Circuit held 8-782 that Proposal 2 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.83 
The court began by noting that the case did not present a “second bite 
at Gratz and Grutter”84 and thus it refused to consider the 
constitutionality of affirmative action policies as a general matter.85 
Rather, the court considered Respondents’ claim that Proposal 2 is 
unconstitutional under both traditional and political process equal 
protection analyses.86 
The court applied the political process doctrine in a two-step 
inquiry.87 First, it considered whether Proposal 2 targeted a program 
that specifically benefitted a racial minority—in other words, whether 
a racial minority could consider the policy to be in its interest.88  
Accordingly, because minorities lobbied for the implementation of 
 
 78.  Id. at 330–33 (discussing benefits of holistic diversity). 
 79.  See id. at 333 (“Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular 
professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's views, so too is one's own, unique 
experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still 
matters.”). 
 80.  Id. at 334. 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  The 8-7 vote broke entirely along party lines, with the eight judges in the majority 
nominated by Democratic presidents and the seven judges in the minority nominated by 
Republican presidents. However, one judge in the majority was first nominated by President 
Clinton and later renominated by President Bush as part of a compromise. Adam Liptak, 
‘Politicians in Robes’? Not Exactly But..., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/11/27/us/judges-rulings-follow-partisan-lines.html?_r=0.  
 83.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 470 
(6th Cir. 2012) (“The existence of such a comparative structural burden undermines the Equal 
Protection Clause’s guarantee . . . . We therefore . . . find Proposal 2 unconstitutional.”), cert. 
granted sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013). 
 84.  Id. at 473. 
 85.  Id. (“[W]e are neither required nor inclined to weigh in on the constitutional status or 
relative merits of race-conscious admissions policies as such.”). 
 86.  See id. (noting that both the Coalition and the Cantrell plaintiffs challenged Proposal 2 
under a political process analysis, but only the Coalition plaintiffs raised a traditional equal 
protection challenge). 
 87.  Id. at 477. 
 88.  Id. at 478. 
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affirmative action policies, Proposal 2 satisfied this prong.89 
For the second prong, the court considered whether Proposal 2 
altered the political structure in a way that placed a special burden on 
racial minorities’ ability to participate in the political process.90 This 
entailed two considerations.91 First, the court determined that because 
Michigan voters elected the board members at Michigan’s state 
universities, and the board members have the authority to determine 
admissions policies, affirmative action policies are a political 
decision.92 Second, the court noted that Proposal 2 forces racial 
minorities to seek a constitutional amendment in order to secure 
future affirmative action policies.93 Lobbying board members for the 
implementation of affirmative action policies would be ineffective 
because under Proposal 2 board members are prohibited from 
enacting such policies.94 However, groups favoring the inclusion of 
other admissions factors, such as alumni connections, can still 
effectively lobby board members.95 Thus, Proposal 2 imposes a 
discriminatory burden on minorities alone.96 
Accordingly, the court applied strict scrutiny and found Proposal 2 
failed because Michigan did not present a compelling state interest.97 
Because Proposal 2 violated the political process doctrine, the court 
declined to evaluate Proposal 2 under a traditional Equal Protection 
Clause analysis.98 
The dissenting judges filed five separate opinions.99 All of the 
dissenters argued, to some degree, that because Proposal 2 only 
repeals affirmative action, a race-preference policy, in favor of race-
neutral admissions policies, it should not be held unconstitutional.100 
 
 89.  Id. at 478–79. 
 90.  Id. at 480. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 480–83.   
 93.  Id. at 484. 
 94.  Id.  
 95.  Id. at 484–85. 
 96.  Id. at 485. 
 97.  Id. at 488–89 (noting that “because the Attorney General does not assert that Proposal 
2 satisfies a compelling state interest, we need not consider this argument”). 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 470. 
 100.  Id. at 493 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (“[H]olding it to be a violation of equal protection for 
the ultimate political authority to declare a uniform policy of non-discrimination is vastly far 
afield from the Supreme Court precedents.”); id. at 511–12 (Griffin, J., dissenting) (“The post-
Civil War amendment that guarantees equal protection to persons of all races has now been 
construed as barring a state from prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race.”); id. at 498 
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Judge Griffin took this argument a step further, arguing that the 
political process doctrine conflicts with mainstream equal protection 
jurisprudence by eliminating the inquiry into discriminatory intent.101 
Accordingly, the political process doctrine operates as “an aberration 
inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment” and should be 
invalidated.102 Judges Gibbons and Sutton noted that affirmative 
action policies are not constitutionally required because they deviate 
from the constitutional norm of non-discrimination.103 Thus, Michigan 
should be free to effectively repeal affirmative action policies and 
adopt race-neutral admissions policies.104 Finally, Judge Rogers 
observed that the court’s holding made it impossible for a state with 
local governments to pass an anti-discrimination law.105 
Michigan appealed, and the Supreme Court granted its petition 
for writ of certiorari to consider whether a state violates the Equal 
Protection Clause by amending its constitution to prohibit race- and 
sex-based discrimination or preferential treatment in public-
university admissions decisions.106 
 
 
(Gibbons, J., dissenting) (“[E]qual treatment is  the baseline rule embodied in the Equal 
Protection Clause, from which racial-preference programs are a departure.”); id. at 505 (Rogers, 
J., dissenting) (joining Judge Gibbons’s dissent); id. at 505 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (joining Judge 
Gibbons’s dissent). 
 101.  Id. at 512–13 (Griffin, J., dissenting) (noting that in Hunter and Seattle “the Supreme 
Court held that strict scrutiny applied without any need for the respective plaintiffs to show that 
the laws were enacted as a result of discriminatory intent or were inexplicable on grounds other 
than race”). 
 102.  Id. at 512 (discussing the need to invalidate the political process doctrine). 
 103.  Id. at 494 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (referring to “absence of any precedent suggesting 
that states must employ racial preferences in university admissions”); id. at 506 (Sutton, J., 
dissenting) (“If racial preferences are only occasionally and barely constitutional, it cannot be 
the case that they are always required.”). 
 104.  Id. at 494 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (“Although it has convinced a majority of this court,  
plaintiffs’ argument must be understood for the marked departure it represents—for the first 
time, the presumptively invalid policy of racial and gender preference has been judicially 
entrenched as beyond the political process.”); id. at 506 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (“A first premise 
for resolving this case is, and must be, that a State does not deny equal treatment by mandating 
it.”). 
 105.  Id. at 505 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“Under the majority opinion, it is hard to see how 
any level of state government that has a subordinate level can pass a no-race-preference 
regulation, ordinance, or law.”). 
106.      Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013); Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari at i, No. 12-682 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2012).  
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V. ARGUMENTS 
A. Arguments for Petitioner 
1. Affirmative Action Jurisprudence 
Petitioner argues that the Sixth Circuit decision is inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence.107 The 
Sixth Circuit concluded that Proposal 2 repealed affirmative action 
programs that benefited minorities, thereby satisfying the first prong 
of the political process analysis.108 However, Petitioner notes that the 
only compelling government interest that justifies affirmative action 
programs is holistic diversity benefitting all students.109 A valid 
affirmative action program cannot primarily benefit minority 
students.110 Thus, the majority finds itself in a bind.111 By holding that 
Michigan’s affirmative action policies benefit minorities, the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision runs afoul of the Court’s affirmative action 
precedent.112 Conversely, the court cannot conclude that Michigan’s 
affirmative action policies fulfill the compelling interest in holistic 
diversity because the first prong of the political process test requires 
that the policy in question specifically benefit minorities.113 Such a 
holding would push Proposal 2 outside the scope of the political 
process doctrine.114 Thus, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion illustrates the 
incompatibility between the political process doctrine and the Court’s 
affirmative action jurisprudence.115 
2.  Policy Consequences 
Petitioner also contends that the Sixth Circuit’s application of the 
political process doctrine calls into question the constitutionality of 
anti-discrimination laws.116 For instance, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 
prohibits racial discrimination in the real estate market and preempts 
state laws granting preferential treatment based on race.117 In effect, 
 
 107.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 22–23. 
 108.  Id. at 22.  
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id.  
 111.  Id. at 23. 
 112.  Id.  
 113.  Id.  
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Id. (“A Grutter plan and a political-restructuring theory are incompatible.”). 
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id. 
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the Fair Housing Act restructures the political process, moving anti-
discrimination policies in real estate from the local level to the federal 
level.118 Consequently, minorities can no longer effectively lobby local 
or state governments for legislation that would grant them special 
consideration in the real estate market.119 Thus, Petitioner concludes 
that the Fair Housing Act, and other anti-discrimination legislation, 
could be invalidated on political process grounds, a far-reaching 
implication that Petitioner concludes is inconsistent with the rationale 
behind Hunter and Seattle School District.120 
3.  Proposal 2 is Distinguishable from Hunter and Seattle School 
District 
Petitioner asserts that Proposal 2 is distinguishable from both 
Hunter and Seattle School District.121 Proposal 2 eliminates affirmative 
action policies that grant minorities special consideration.122 
Conversely, the amendment in Hunter eliminated an anti-
discrimination policy and burdened future attempts to reach racial 
neutrality.123 Further, Seattle School District is distinguishable because 
Initiative 350 repealed a busing plan designed to remedy de facto 
racial segregation.124 Thus, unlike Proposal 2, the busing system was 
anti-discriminatory, not preferential.125 
B.  Arguments for Respondents 
1. The Sixth Circuit Properly Applied Precedent 
Respondents argue that the Sixth Circuit decision should be 
upheld as a faithful application of the political process doctrine set 
forth in Hunter and Seattle School District.126 Prior to Proposal 2, all 
groups could lobby for special consideration in the admissions 
process.127 Accordingly, minorities advocated for affirmative action, a 
constitutional means of ameliorating the impact of past racial 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 24. 
 121.  Id. at 17. 
 122.  Id. at 20. 
 123.  Id. at 18. 
 124.  Id. at 18–19.  
 125.  Id. 
 126.  See Coalition Respondents’ Brief on the Merits at 30, Schuette v. Coal. to Defend 
Affirmative Action, No. 12–682 (U.S. Aug. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Coalition Brief]. 
 127.  Id. at 38. 
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discrimination.128 Moreover, Respondents note that racial minorities 
are just one of many groups, including children of alumni and athletes, 
that receive preferential treatment in the admissions process.129 
However, by making affirmative action illegal, Proposal 2 deprives 
minorities, and only minorities, of the ability to advocate for 
preferential treatment.130 This creates a discriminatory burden in the 
same manner as did the situations in Hunter and Seattle School 
District.131 Because Proposal 2 singles out minorities for this special 
burden, it violates the Equal Protection Clause under a political 
process analysis.132 
2.  Refuting the Fair Housing Act Hypothetical 
Respondents refute Petitioner’s argument that the political 
process doctrine could invalidate antidiscrimination legislation, like 
the Fair Housing Act.133 Respondents note that federal law preempts 
state law under the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution, so long as Congress acts in an area of enumerated 
authority.134 Therefore, the Constitution requires that in certain 
circumstances the “locus of decisionmaking” move from the state or 
local level to the federal level.135 Accordingly, our federal system 
envisioned that federal legislation, like the Fair Housing Act, would 
preempt conflicting state laws.136 Thus, the political process doctrine 
cannot require the invalidation of federal antidiscrimination 
legislation, like the Fair Housing Act, because doing so would be 
inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause.137 
 
 
 
 
 128.  Id.  
 129.  Id. at 37. 
 130.  Id. at 38.  
 131.  Id. at 30–31. 
 132.  Id. at 38. 
 133.  Brief for Respondents Chase Cantrell, et al. at 44, Schuette v. Coal. to Defend 
Affirmative Action, No. 12–682 (U.S. Aug. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Cantrell Brief]. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
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VI. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court should reverse the Sixth Circuit decision. The 
Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence and the political process 
doctrine are incompatible because a valid affirmative action program 
cannot violate the political process doctrine.138 Further, ambiguity in 
the political process doctrine provides judges too much leeway to 
apply their own views of affirmative action, resulting in inconsistent 
opinions. To combat these problems, the Court should hold that the 
political process doctrine does not apply when a government 
restructuring effectively repeals affirmative action programs in favor 
of race-neutral admissions policies. The Court should consider 
Proposal 2 under a traditional equal protection analysis and find it 
constitutional.139 
A.  Problems with the Political Process Doctrine 
The political process doctrine fails to resolve the baseline question 
of whether race-neutral policies implicate political process concerns.140 
Professor Spann argues that this ambiguity allows judges to exploit 
their own personal opinion of affirmative action when applying the 
political process doctrine in affirmative action cases.141 For instance, 
the Ninth Circuit’s Wilson opinion characterizes Proposition 209 as 
race neutral because it prohibits racial discrimination.142 But this 
holding only follows if one disregards the residual impacts of past 
racial discrimination. Conversely, the Wilson district court 
characterized Proposition 209 as a race-based classification, adopting 
a baseline that considers the effects of past discrimination.143 The 
problem is that Proposition 209 can be characterized as either 
discriminatory or neutral, depending on whether or not the judge 
 
 138.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 23 (“A Grutter plan and a political-restructuring 
theory are incompatible.”); Bernstein, supra note 11. 
 139.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 14–16.  
 140.  See Spann, supra note 9, at 269–70 (“[E]qual protection doctrine itself is simply too 
indeterminate to produce a resolution of the constitutional issues raised by Proposition 209.”). 
 141.  Id. at 270 (“It seems that a judge’s only choice is to fall back on his own political 
preferences in order to give the Equal Protection Clause operative meaning.”). 
 142.  See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 709 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A state law 
that prohibits classifications based on race or gender is a law that addresses in a neutral-fashion 
race-related and gender-related matters.”).  
 143.  See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1505 (N.D. Cal. 1996) 
(“Because the Court finds . . . that Proposition 209 singles out an issue of special concern to 
minorities and women—race- and gender-conscious affirmative action—and alters the political 
process solely with respect to this issue, it concludes that the initiative plainly rests on 
distinctions based on race.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
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adopts a baseline that considers past racial discrimination.144 However, 
the doctrine does not establish a baseline.145 This allows judges to use 
the ambiguity in the discriminatory-neutral distinction as a proxy to 
substitute their own preferences regarding affirmative action, which 
creates divergent opinions. 
The majority and dissenting opinions in Schuette highlight this 
ambiguity. For instance, Judge Boggs’s dissent argues that the political 
process doctrine should not apply because Proposal 2 creates race-
neutral admissions programs and only burdens minorities’ efforts to 
receive preferential treatment.146 Conversely, the majority holds that 
the political process doctrine applies to Proposal 2 because Hunter 
and Seattle School District establish that courts should apply the 
political process doctrine for both race-neutral and race-preference 
policies.147 Schuette thus presents another example of how ambiguity 
in the political process doctrine creates inconsistent judicial 
application. 
B.  The Political Process Doctrine Clashes with Affirmative Action 
Jurisprudence 
The Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence and the political 
process doctrine are completely incompatible.148 If, as the Sixth Circuit 
holds, state university affirmative action programs are designed to 
benefit minorities, then the affirmative action programs are 
unconstitutional because holistic diversity benefitting all students is 
the only compelling interest that can justify race-conscious admissions 
policies.149 However, if the affirmative action programs do not benefit 
minorities in particular, then the affirmative action programs cannot 
satisfy the political process doctrine, which requires that the policy in 
 
 144.  See Spann, supra note 9, at 261. 
 145.  See id. at 269–70 (“The reason that neither the district court nor the court of appeals 
was able to articulate a doctrinally satisfying justification . . . is that equal protection doctrine 
itself is simply too indeterminate to produce a resolution of the constitutional issues raised by 
Proposition 209.”). 
 146.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 493 
(6th Cir. 2012) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (“[H]olding it to be a violation of equal protection for the 
ultimate political authority to declare a uniform policy of non-discrimination is vastly far afield 
from the Supreme Court precedents.”), cert. granted sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend 
Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013). 
 147.  Id. at 485–86.  
 148.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 23 (“A Grutter plan and a political-restructuring 
theory are incompatible.”); Bernstein, supra note 11. 
 149.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 22–23. 
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question specifically benefit minorities.150 Thus, a valid affirmative 
action program cannot violate the political process doctrine.151 
Because the Sixth Circuit majority opinion relies on an inaccurate 
reading of the Court’s affirmative action precedent, the decision must 
be overturned.152 
Tellingly, neither Hunter nor Seattle School District, the doctrinal 
bases for the Sixth Circuit’s decision, involve an affirmative action 
program.153 In fact, Seattle School District suggests that the political 
process doctrine was never meant to apply to affirmative action.154 In 
a footnote, Justice Powell’s dissent emphasizes that the logical 
extension of the Seattle School District decision is that “if the 
admissions committee of a state law school developed an affirmative-
action plan that came under fire, the Court apparently would find it 
unconstitutional for any higher authority to intervene unless that 
authority traditionally dictated admissions policies.”155 The Seattle 
School District majority considered Powell’s point, but ultimately 
concluded it was inapplicable because university admissions policies 
were not related to minority participation in government.156 Thus, it 
seems as though the Seattle School District Court never intended its 
decision to apply to a situation involving the effective repeal of an 
affirmative action program as with Proposal 2.157 
C.  Proposal 2 Survives Traditional Equal Protection Analysis 
To overcome these problems, the Supreme Court should hold that 
the political process doctrine does not apply to the effective repeal of 
affirmative action programs in favor of race-neutral admissions 
policies. Here, like the busing remedy in Crawford, Michigan’s state 
universities adopted affirmative action, a policy that is not 
constitutionally required.158 By eliminating affirmative action, 
 
 150.  Id. at 23. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id.  
 153.  Emily Bazelon, The Michigan Experiment: The Affirmative Action Case Liberals 
Deserve to Lose, SLATE (Oct. 14, 2013, 5:44 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/new_and_ 
politics/jurisprudence/2013/10/supreme_court_s_michigan_affirmative_action_case_liberals_des
erve_to_lose.html?wpisrc=burger_bar. 
 154.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 19 (“So even the Seattle School District 
majority did not view the opinion as controlling the outcome in a case like this one.”). 
 155.  Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 498 n.14 (1982) (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
 156.  Id. at 480 n.23 (majority opinion).  
 157.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 19. 
 158.  See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 
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Proposal 2 merely creates race-neutral admissions policies.159 In effect, 
Proposal 2 repeals affirmative action policies, thus bringing it within 
the scope of the Crawford decision.160 
With the political process question settled, the Court should find 
Proposal 2 constitutional under a traditional equal protection 
analysis.161 Under a traditional equal protection analysis, legislation 
that classifies individuals along racial lines receives strict scrutiny.162 
However, Proposal 2 does not classify along racial lines.163 In fact, it 
forbids the use of racial classifications in the college admissions 
process.164 
The next inquiry under the traditional Equal Protection Clause 
analysis is whether Proposal 2 has a discriminatory impact and 
discriminatory purpose.165 The Court should find that Proposal 2 has a 
discriminatory impact because it deprives minorities of the special 
consideration they receive under affirmative action.166 However, 
Proposal 2 did not pass because of a discriminatory purpose.167 Voters 
may have considered a host of non-discriminatory factors when 
voting on Proposal 2 and therefore it is not possible to say Proposal 2 
passed due to a discriminatory purpose.168 Absent a discriminatory 
 
511 (6th Cir. 2012) (Sutton, J., dissenting) (“If racial preferences are only occasionally and 
barely constitutional, it cannot be the case that they are always required.”), cert. granted sub 
nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013). 
 159.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 14. 
 160.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 511 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (noting that 
a repeal, similar to that in Crawford, is “all that happened here”). 
 161.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 14–16. 
 162.  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (holding that even benign 
racial classifications receive strict scrutiny).  
 163.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 14. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–42 (“Disproportionate impact is not 
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the 
Constitution.”). The Court also noted that “our cases have not embraced the proposition that a 
law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, 
is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially discriminatory impact.” Id. 
 166.  See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 705 (9th Cir. 1997). The Supreme 
Court will likely agree with the Ninth Circuit’s Wilson opinion and hold that “Proposition 209 
burdens members of insular minorities . . . who otherwise would seek to obtain race-based and 
gender-based preferential treatment from local entities.” See id.   
 167.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 15–16 (endorsing the district court’s finding 
that there are alternative justifications for supporting Proposal 2 other than racial animus and 
neither Proposal 2’s ballot history, nor the public arguments in support of its passage suggest 
discriminatory purpose). 
 168.  See id. The district court lists a series of non-discriminatory motivations that 
proponents of Proposal 2 may have based their decision upon, including: a belief that 
affirmative action policies actually harm minorities, self-interest in receiving acceptance to a 
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purpose, Proposal 2 must only survive rational basis review.169 
Proposal 2 can satisfy rational basis review because it “[i]t was not 
irrational for a majority of Michigan’s voters to end race- and sex-
conscious admissions policies.”170   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Schuette presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify 
ambiguity in the political process doctrine and avoid the doctrinal 
problems that arise when courts apply the political process doctrine in 
an affirmative action case.171 The political process doctrine is 
ambiguous on whether the repeal of a race-preference program in 
favor of a race-neutral program implicates political process 
concerns.172 This ambiguity allows judges to inject their own view of 
affirmative action into the inquiry, creating widely divergent 
opinions,173 a trend illustrated by the Sixth Circuit majority and 
dissenting opinions.174 Further, applying the political process doctrine 
in an affirmative action case creates a catch-22 where a court cannot 
find that a valid affirmative action program satisfies the two-part 
political process test.175 The Sixth Circuit opinion relies on this 
improper analysis.176 
Therefore, the Court should reverse the Sixth Circuit and 
distinguish Schuette by holding that the political process doctrine does 
not apply to the effective repeal of affirmative programs in favor of 
 
state university, a belief that affirmative action perpetuates stereotypes, and a preference for 
implementation of affirmative action programs based on socio-economic factors. Id. 
 169.  Id. at 16. 
 170.  See id. (noting that Proposal 2 can likely survive rational basis review). 
 171.  See Spann, supra note 9, at 269–70 (discussing problems inherent in applying the 
political process doctrine). 
 172.  See id. (“The reason that neither the district court nor the court of appeals was able to 
articulate a doctrinally satisfying justification . . . is that equal protection doctrine itself is simply 
too indeterminate to produce a resolution of the constitutional issues raised by Proposition 
209.”). 
 173.  See id. at 270 (“It seems that a judge’s only choice is to fall back on his own political 
preferences in order to give the Equal Protection Clause operative meaning.”). 
 174.  See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 
493 (6th Cir. 2012) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (“[H]olding it to be a violation of equal protection  
for the ultimate political authority to declare a uniform policy of non-discrimination is vastly far 
afield from the Supreme Court precedents.”), cert. granted sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend 
Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013); but see id. at 485–86 (majority opinion) (holding that 
the political process doctrine applies to both race-neutral and race-preference measures).  
 175.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 23 (“A Grutter plan and a political-
restructuring theory are incompatible.”). 
 176.  Id. at 22–23. 
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race-neutral admissions policies. The Court should find Proposal 2 
constitutional under a traditional equal protection analysis because 
there is insufficient evidence for the Court to find that Proposal 2 
passed with a discriminatory intent, a requirement for an equal 
protection violation under the traditional analysis.177 
 
 177.  Id. at 14–16. 
